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C OV ER S TORY
Insights
 → To make consent meaningful, 
we need greater “apparency” 
of how data is being used.
 → For the scale and speed of 
the IoT, apparency/consent 
decisions will need to be 
automated on our behalf.
 → There is rich potential to 
create human-centered, 
nuanced services that can 
leverage the negotiation of 
consent/sharing terms. 
100 images gets you a tax credit. But 
you’re not sharing these with pet shops—
you don’t have a pet. And they don’t need 
to know that. Right now, many feel like 
personal data use is heading toward the 
Minority Report dystopia. HCI and AI are 
well placed to reimagine personal data 
sharing as a more equitable, negotiable, 
and sustainable practice than either 
today’s take-it-or-leave-it, agree-or-
not approach or tomorrow’s dystopian 
disempowered bombardment. Research 
and design in HCI will help create that 
better future. Indeed, this article focuses 
on how, with the Internet of Things (IoT) 
about to explode, it is essential that 
HCI, along with AI, embrace this space, 
and design it from a human-centered, 
human-valued perspective. We propose 
several concepts and questions to help 
envision the IoT as such a consentful, 
human-centered space. 
Remember the scene in Minority Report 
where Tom Cruise’s character walks 
through a mall and is met with a bar-
rage of ads? Somehow the stores have 
his data and can deliver customized ads 
that today’s social media campaigns can 
only dream of. We find the bombardment 
hideous. This is the predicted future of 
the smart home, city, and vehicle—or 
rather, the dystopian view. There is an 
alternative. Imagine walking through 
these same areas without the ads be-
cause, like the entourage of a celebrity, 
you have agents working on your behalf 
to fend them off, while making sure your 
mom—or other important or personally 
interesting information—can still reach 
you. After all, you’re not against sharing 
some of your personal data. Your agents 
know you’ll be happy to share your photos 
of local dogs with an SPCA citizen-science 
project about strays in town, where every 
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to consent, this status quo is not 
surprising. Regulation, unfortunately, 
has to date created only a veneer of 
consent—a legal illusion of choice and 
control—but design has not delivered 
interactions that support genuine 
informed choices that regulators assume 
data-harvesting services should follow. 
The stats are very clear about how 
broken terms and conditions pages are: 
If we were to read these “agreements” it 
would be nearly a full-time job [1]. More 
disturbingly, these terms are generally 
written to require a sophisticated level 
of reading comprehension—beyond 
the norm for the population using these 
services [2]. So even if we did read these 
T&C, most of us wouldn’t understand 
them. When we give our consent under 
such conditions, it isn’t meaningful.
We are also asked to consider these 
terms at exactly the moment work in 
HCI on task interruption has shown is 
the wrong time [3]: when that request 
gets in the way of our primary task. 
We click the “agree” button because 
clicking it gets rid of the screen so that 
we can get on with posting our cat video 
or uploading a draft of our paper to a 
co-editing site or synchronizing our 
calendar with a cloud service. 
Many of us became acclimatized to 
this meaningless box clicking around 
installing software: Yes, yes we don’t 
own it, uh huh we’re just leasing it, and 
no we won’t make copies of it. Sure. In 
those days, however, it was rare for 
software to call home to the mothership 
to locate our particular copies. Now, 
it is commonplace for software to be 
deployed as a service that knows exactly 
where it is and how many copies have 
been authorized. But that service, 
especially when deployed on phones 
or mobile devices, gathers far more 
information for very amorphous reasons 
than just registration confirmation. 
More troubling, as has been shown when 
installing apps on phones: Few people 
are even aware that the app is (re)setting 
permissions to access personal data not 
needed for its operation [4], such as our 
contacts and text messages. There is 
also the belief that this personal-data 
capture is a trade with the developer, 
and that if one pays for the app then 
that data trade is closed. Not so. Some 
apps take even more liberties in the paid 
version. Consent is not meaningless in 
this context—it’s nonexistent. 
In the app case, research suggests 
that few people are aware that data-
The Internet of Things, we are told, 
is about to achieve epic scale, with 
Cisco and Ericsson (Dave Evans and 
Hans Vestburg, respectively) having 
predicted that there will be 50 billion 
devices connected to the Internet by 
2020 (though each have since revised 
their estimates down to 30 billion and 
28 billion). Their ecosystem is wildly 
heterogeneous. Many devices will be 
capturing the same identification data 
over and over; others will be part of 
networks sharing data, such as cars 
moving through various jurisdictions 
and associated infrastructures with 
their own terms for data sharing. One 
of the key concerns of the IoT and its 
high-speed cousin, the Internet of 
Vehicles, is just how that data may be 
captured and shared, not only within 
one fixed environment like a home, but 
across environments, from the wired 
High Street (like that shopping scene 
in Minority Report mapping ads to 
eyeballs to associated customer profiles) 
to moving from one location to another. 
In other words, as the objects of our 
environment become more connected 
to the Net, do we simply become 
another thing on the Net, reducing our 
privacy, and our civic values, in the 
names of everything from convenience 
to counterterrorism? Likewise, given 
the vast scale, speed, and heterogeneity 
of this new ecosystem, are we creating 
new risks to our personal and national 
security, both as citizens and as 
societies—not even from willful 
hacking but just because the scale of our 
IoT reach will exceed our grasp of all the 
necessary protections that we assume 
are ours in a civil society? 
In response to the current data status 
quo and in anticipation of this changing 
ecosystem, new rules for data sharing 
have been established. For example, the 
General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) approved by the EU Parliament 
on April 14, 2016, will be enforced 
across the Union (and enshrined in 
law by the U.K.) starting May 25, 
2018. These regulations have been put 
in place well in advance of the technical 
means to sustain their implementation. 
Consequently, there is a key moment 
for HCI and UX research and design to 
influence society for good, not just to 
design wonderful devices for the IoT but 
also to consider the wicked problems of 
how to make apparent for developers, 
designers, businesses, policymakers, and 
citizens the mechanisms and personal-
data-driven assumptions that enable the 
IoT. By this deliberate engagement we 
can help surface the implications of data 
sharing in order to develop models of 
understanding, social expectations for 
understanding trade-offs, and means for 
developers to know their designs comply 
with these expectations and for citizens 
and policymakers to be able to trust 
that they do. Because of our expertise 
in understanding both technology and 
especially human-centered approaches 
to design, we have this key role to play in 
informing the shape of these exchanges 
and to create an ecosystem that supports 
social, technical, meaningful consent at 
IoT scale.
To better see these opportunities for 
the future, let’s consider the status quo 
of data-sharing consent in the current 
digital economy.
CITIZEN CONSENT IN  
DATA SHARING: THE 
MARGARINE OF CONSENT
The Internet has made liars of us all. 
No one has used a browser, a social 
media site, or a smartphone app without 
encountering a box that says, before 
continuing, that A) we have read the 
terms and conditions of a service and 
B) we agree to them. We click “agree” 
when we haven’t a clue if we do or 
don’t. In other words, in a world where 
our personal data is largely the oil 
that greases the wheels that keep the 
Internet running, we have very little 
meaningful say in what data is collected 
and how it’s used, and why we may 
wish to limit it, or for that matter, give 
it away in buckets. Given the current 
(some might say insulting) approach 
We click the “agree” button because 
clicking it gets rid of the screen so that  
we can get on with posting our cat video 
or uploading a draft of our paper.
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access permissions can be set per app 
to limit access to that data [4]. And why 
would a person consider whether it’s OK 
for an app to access some of their data 
if they have no awareness this data is 
being accessed in the first place? Indeed, 
the situation is not much different on 
the Web. For people in some areas of 
computing, we may take it for granted 
that unless we use services like ad 
blockers or virtual private networks, we 
are being tracked across interlocking 
webs via mechanisms like fingerprinting 
and cookies. For instance, every time we 
put a URL into a social media feed and 
it is shortened by that service, that URL 
reflects its path through the network—
who has used it, who has looked at it, 
where they’ve gone after visiting it, and 
so on [5]. Our social networks and beliefs 
are effectively exposed. New research-
based services like TrackMeNot 
(https://cs.nyu.edu/trackmenot/) 
run randomized Web searches from 
our browsers in order to confuse this 
profile that is constructible from our 
footsteps through these pathways of the 
Net. Problematically, however, the few 
studies that have looked at how tracking 
is perceived show that only a small 
number of people in the general public 
are aware of the degree to which they 
are being followed online, or that their 
Internet traffic is being shared among 
various, mostly commercial entities. 
The data suggests that when people do 
learn of this tracking, they characterize 
it as creepy [6] and want to find ways to 
control it [7].
We see this awareness effect in 
other data-related transactions: Once 
people are aware of what is happening 
to their data without their consent, 
they demand better conditions. What 
of the privacy paradox, then? In other 
words, that people say they’re concerned 
about privacy, but if you put a form 
in front of them and request personal 
data, they readily hand it over. As 
more researchers have now shown, this 
response is not a contradiction. We 
are a sense-making people: If we are 
asked for something—especially tied to 
something we want—we assume there 
must be a rationale for it. We assume 
the best. When responses are probed, 
however, many people who provide very 
personal data to a service do so without 
a clear model of how that data may be 
used by the service itself; how that data 
may be used by other people accessing 
that service; what of that data is actually 
necessary for the service to function; 
and the risks associated with sharing 
that data. We are busy: It is easier to 
trust there is a good reason for this data 
request, it seems, than to stop and check 
if we’re being scammed. Indeed, we 
need only consider the outrage when 
those who do stop and look raise a red 
flag about terms and conditions. Doing 
so, however, has required the work of 
what we might call social interpreters 
to translate the language of the revised 
terms and conditions, moving it out of 
the abstract and into concrete terms 
that are meaningful to people. These 
changes otherwise remain opaque, 
again making our consent socially 
meaningless. 
TOWARD APPARENCY  
AND SEMANTIC/PRAGMATIC 
TRANSPARENCY
Just from the above scenarios, we can see 
numerous opportunities for interaction 
research and UX design to change 
the status quo around data consent. 
Fundamental to any change, however, 
is to see a need for it. This is what we’ve 
been calling apparency. One may have 
very well-defined terms and conditions, 
but if people don’t even know that their 
contacts are being accessed by a puzzle 
game they downloaded, if this use is not 
apparent in the first place, transparency 
about the terms of an unperceived 
process is at best meaningless. 
As designers, we can help to develop 
the means to make such data processes 
apparent in order for the terms to 
be meaningfully transparent. In the 
context of ubiquitous computing, 
Matthew Chalmers [8] framed making 
the properties of a system apparent 
as “seamfulness,” as opposed to 
seamlessness or, more particularly, 
sameness. For instance, rather than 
hiding which cellphone tower a phone 
may be using, it might be better to make 
this information available. Some people 
might find it useful and empowering: 
Being able to look under the hood of 
a system at various levels of detail, 
specifically in order to engage with it 
and change it, is a valuable property. 
In data-driven services—like most 
of those on the Internet—one can point 
to the terms and conditions and label 
them as either transparent or opaque, 
based on the language used and the 
specificity of descriptions. But such 
transparency refers largely to only an 
acknowledgement that data is being 
collected and that it may be used to 
“improve the quality of the service”—as 
cookie notices on websites in the EU 
constantly assert without explanation 
of what or how, exactly. Apparency 
would seek to make those connections 
clear and traceable toward meaningful 
transparency. For example, there are 
no cues to the user of a downloaded 
game that make it apparent that there 
are personal-data settings associated 
with this app and that changing them 
(or not) will have an effect on risks 
of burglary (GPS access), identity 
theft (contacts access), workplace 
harassment (enabling anyone online 
to see pictures from social occasions), 
job-selection discrimination (social 
media commentary being available), or 
preferential or discriminatory pricing 
[9]. Nor is it readily apparent that shared 
data is churned into use for targeting 
advertisements, not only on the site 
where the data is initiated but also from 
that site to other sites, and through a 
network of brokers and advertisers, as a 
person surfs the Web [5]. The simple act 
of touching these sites is of course itself 
valuable data that is both unapparent 
and untransparent.
Indeed, we might reframe a 
progressive scale from apparency 
to transparency, in which we have 
apparency, semantic transparency, 
and pragmatic transparency. Let’s 
call it apparency to s/p transparency. 
Apparency reflects how an activity—in 
this case a data activity—is signaled. 
Semantic transparency addresses 
whether we know what the terms of 
the apparent activity are and mean; 
pragmatic transparency reflects the 
degree to which we know what these 
data actions actually do or entail.
There are already lovely examples 
of apparency to s/p transparency 
design online. One elegant, motivating 
example is the very simple HTTPS 
protocol. That S makes a transparent 
process unobtrusively apparent: that the 
connection between you and a website 
is secure and encrypted, that the data 
is not out in the clear for anyone to see. 
Increasingly the S is backed up by a 
padlock icon in the browser’s address 
bar to indicate a secure channel. If 
one is unfamiliar with the padlock, 
clicking on it usually displays text to 
make more of the semantics of the 
process apparent: that data is being 
transmitted over an encrypted channel. 
For pragmatic transparency, these 
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purchasing is part of a similar genre of 
practices where we consider the terms 
and conditions of a policy as best we 
can, well before we actually need the 
policy—in fact, it’s required that we 
have a policy before we need it. We may 
consider the terms and prices of the 
policy, if these change, before we renew, 
and then start shopping around again. 
In other words, for many kinds 
of transactions, we have established 
practices to review attributes from 
the transactions as well as the terms 
and conditions. These reviews fit into 
a larger mechanism that informs our 
quality of life, from how we manage 
debt with financial planning to how we 
manage risk with insurance provisions. 
A key point, however, is that even 
though not all citizens practice such 
fiscal hygiene, the data is there to enable 
those processes. Such is not the case 
for personal-data transactions on the 
Internet. Surely in HCI we can draw 
on these analogous practices to better 
design our engagement with the terms 
and conditions of data consent, and with 
auditing consent transactions? 
NEGOTIATION/AUTOMATION
Of course, one of the reasons for 
reviewing our financial transactions 
is to see if the terms of service are fair. 
After all, when we agree to terms and 
conditions, we engage in a contract 
with the supplier. In the data-driven 
world, however, these contracts are one 
way and binary: We as the consumers 
of the services can say only yay or 
nay. Sometimes, saying nay can feel 
impossible: If one’s whole community 
is making use of a service, it’s hard to be 
the lone holdout. 
Once again, if we turn to real-world 
examples, negotiation is a key part 
of just about any other agreement of 
exchange between parties. We negotiate 
everything from our contract with 
employers or staff to our fee for network 
access. Many of us can’t walk out of 
a shop without either talking a price 
down or haggling for extras at no cost. 
Negotiation is ubiquitous—except on 
the Internet. Why? 
We have been exploring how we 
might be able to automate consent 
in terms of negotiable data-sharing 
preferences using autonomous 
agents [10], and thus begin to create 
richer, non-binary terms for data 
exchange and service provision. In 
this approach, a person can say under 
claims can be explored and tested. 
There is a certificate that can be verified 
regarding the claims made by the S 
and the padlock. These are signifiers of 
apparency, seams that can be exposed 
and tested in terms of semantic and 
pragmatic transparency. We can decide 
how far we wish to probe those signfiers, 
but with them, the resources are there to 
make a more informed judgment about 
the channel. The padlock is an elegant, 
apparent expression that makes the 
semantic and pragmatic transparency of 
a binary state richly available. 
Apparency for the properties that 
would inform a consent decision are 
more nuanced, more variable, and 
potentially more dynamic. A challenge 
we set ourselves as a research team is 
how to raise apparency about one’s 
current appearance on the Web, in 
particular to online trackers that have 
an interest in creating a picture of who 
you are for various purposes, from 
targeted ads to offer discrimination, 
which includes everything from job 
offers to insurance pricing. These 
impressions are based on one’s clicks 
from one Web resource to another. Our 
challenge has been to find metaphors 
to express what this tracking means 
in an apparent, semantically and 
pragmatically transparent way. The 
approach we’ve been testing is called the 
Web Mirror.
AN APPARENCY EXAMPLE: 
THE WEB MIRROR 
There have been third-party efforts, 
such as Mozilla Lightbeam and 
Disconnect.me, to make our traces 
through the Web and what sites track 
us more apparent by using network or 
spring graphs of trackers. In pilot tests 
with participants, these often engender 
a “Wow, what a big graph that is!” 
response, but few people use them, and, 
interestingly, the follow-up question of 
how to make it stop rarely comes up. 
In an effort to help schools in par-
ticular teach students about protect-
ing themselves online, we have been 
piloting a project with teachers called 
the Web Mirror (http://mirror.websci.
net/). Here, we show students not an 
abstract graph but rather a “Web reflec-
tion of you.” That is, we show them what 
the various trackers they’ve touched 
see of their Web history. We use topic 
extraction to infer what the interests of 
someone visiting those websites could 
be, and prompt them to ask, “What 
could my browsing history say about 
me?” Our goal right now is to see if this 
mirroring back to students of what 
their browsing may portray about them 
helps them first to perceive that their 
browsing history is their personal data 
(apparency); that others are processing 
that data as the students move through 
the Web (semantic transparency); and 
how that data can be used to create a va-
riety of pictures about them (pragmatic 
transparency). From this awareness, we 
are keen to empower them to control 
that reflection—in other words, to ac-
tion consent. This is done by connecting 
the students back to how those reflec-
tions can be changed using the current 
means for proactive personal-data 
management (or consent management), 
which means cumbersome tools like ad 
blockers and VPNs. 
TIMING 
As stated earlier, we know from HCI 
research on interruption that when 
we’re asked to consider anything that 
takes us away from our primary task, 
it’s simply not going to get our full 
attention, especially when it’s something 
as abstract as data permissions or terms 
and conditions. Just get out of our way! 
Beyond making a reflection of ourselves 
from our Web travels apparent, a key 
insight from the Web Mirror work is 
that there is high apparency value in 
making the revelation of what personal 
data is desired by a site/app/service, and 
whether or not they should have it, its 
own task in its own time. 
When we look, there are multiple 
examples of such asynchronous 
transactions all around us in the 
physical world. Consider making 
purchases. Each time we withdraw 
cash from a bank machine or use a debit 
or credit card, we get a receipt of the 
transaction—and that’s about it. We 
are not asked to review our purchasing 
history at the time of the transaction. 
Instead, we receive a monthly statement 
both as a record of our spending and 
debts, and as a log we are encouraged to 
review in case of errors. That monthly 
statement itself is a review process, but 
it is a data trail of what has happened 
with our various assets, from cash on 
hand to credit lines. The statement, 
however, along with our receipts, fits 
into a larger practice of personal money 
management, including tasks like 
setting a budget, saving for a purchase, 
investing, and so on. Insurance 
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which conditions or for which types 
of services they may be willing to 
share their text messages but not their 
images, their browsing history but not 
anything else, and so on.
In our studies we see that people 
are willing to share more data on 
average when they can negotiate the 
data-sharing terms. Our studies also 
demonstrate that a negotiation-oriented 
approach to permission management 
better enables people to align their 
data-sharing practices with their 
actual privacy preferences. Our recent 
work (in submission) perhaps not 
surprisingly shows that permissions 
are not sufficiently context-sensitive for 
meaningful consent: Sharing photos is 
far too broad; sharing photos of public 
spaces with health services is more 
appropriate. Being able to trace and 
retract those images is also important. 
We have touched on only two 
designs around consent: 1) our work 
with mirroring back a Web tracker’s 
reflections of us, and 2) offering 
asynchronous opportunities to set 
responsive terms about sharing 
conditions to automate consent. There 
are many more mechanisms HCI 
designers can offer to support richer, 
more nuanced engagement with a data-
sharing ecosystem. It’s important to be 
clear within these design explorations 
that there is a distinction between 
privacy and sharing. People are not 
averse to sharing some personal data. 
Much to our surprise, we often found 
people keen to share data (sometimes 
their friends’ contact information but 
not their own) in exchange for services 
when they understood the terms and 
they had a say in that exchange. In 
other words, where apparency to s/p 
transparency was supported, data-
sharing quality has improved and often 
increased. Likewise, not all businesses 
are driven to grab out on personal data 
wherever possible: At our workshops 
with researchers, policymakers, and 
industry members, we have been 
delighted to find that some businesses 
would like to see how a nuanced data 
policy for negotiating these terms could 
work for new services and be a business 
differentiator. 
THE INTERNET OF TERMS  
AND CONDITIONS (OF THINGS)
We already experience what has been 
called consent fatigue when we are 
regularly asked to agree to effectively 
meaningless terms and conditions. 
Likewise, when terms and conditions 
change—and we see such notices—it 
seems gratuitous to ask us to say we 
agree to new terms when, what is 
our choice if we do not yet we wish to 
buy an app from a developer that is 
available only through this one vendor 
site? The number of times UK/EU 
citizens see “this site uses cookies”—
when there are no options not to accept 
them—has caused more annoyance 
than engagement. The current state 
of the art for consent, therefore, is 
meaningless consent. But at least 
we might say we are asked. We see a 
screen. We hit a button. 
In the Internet of Things (IoT), the 
predicted number of devices that we will 
encounter in our homes, on the way to 
work, at work, at play, and on the road 
is, to use a biblical term and all it entails, 
legion. In the IoT, every fridge will know 
your name, but many things will not 
have interfaces through which consent 
can be requested and given—or not. 
Interactions will be handed off from 
one infrastructure to another. As we 
move between districts, our consent 
may be either assumed unnecessary or 
implied as given, yet the data terms and 
conditions that apply when moving from 
one infrastructure to another—and the 
guarantees of data protection—may be 
different. Many may recall the problems 
of Google Street View taking pictures 
with identifiable people in the images: 
No consent was obtained. Likewise, 
there are recent examples in subways, 
malls, and museums in the U.K., and 
airports in the U.S., where the MAC 
address of a mobile phone is tracked 
without any requests for consent or 
any options to shut off access to this 
information that was never intended 
for these purposes, the assertion being 
that MAC addresses are not tied to the 
individual. Both legal and technical 
experts [11] would argue that this 
assertion is at best dubious, and further 
that such data is all too easy to combine 
with one or two other seemingly 
innocuous data bits to de-anonymize 
someone. 
These kinds of seemingly anonymous 
though personal data-tracking contexts 
are key examples of how ICT/HCI 
expertise can help shape policy: We are 
part of the dialogue around identifying 
the art of the possible for interactive 
technology to support citizens’ 
well-being. Ours is the community 
with insight into what is possible for 
interactive technology to do now, 
or in the near future, to help shape 
approaches to laws for individual and 
social interaction. 
Fundamentally, if, as a civil society, 
we assert a right or belief or ethical 
principle that we have a stake in the use 
of the data we generate as citizens, and 
a right to privacy around our metadata, 
whether about what we read or where we 
sit to read it, then we need mechanisms 
that can negotiate our consent on our 
behalf at both IoT scale and IoT speed. 
It is eminently possible to build such 
infrastructures of consent. But for 
them to be effective, HCI has a key 
contribution to make to ensure that the 
approaches are both meaningful and 
sensible. Here we discuss just a few of 
the questions HCI research can help 
address.
How do users model IoT apparency 
and s/p transparency? The IoT is still 
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Likewise, a software service cannot 
come along to map to the hardware in 
order to create an open data repository 
of step counting from any tracking 
source. This could act as a public good 
or a research archive, or could support 
citizen science to explore who does the 
most stepping in what age group at what 
time of day. If we buy the hardware, 
the current model allows us to talk 
only to its software service or cloud. 
One might call this a kind of consent 
choice, but again, when all trackers 
play by these rules, one is not choosing 
among data models but rather among 
colors. This example is just of one 
device. Apple’s proprietary ecosystem 
with its home and health kits promises 
to be the infrastructure that bridges 
between devices, providing analytics 
and a common voice-enabled interface. 
The apparency to consumers of how 
data flows behind this convenience 
is largely occluded. We don’t mean 
to say that the ecosystem is evil, but 
rather that without these flows and 
constraints being apparent, we cannot 
truly consent to our data flowing into 
the common pool of these ecosystems; 
innovation is more throttled than 
enabled. 
Can users form adequate  
models of device ecosystems and  
their infrastructure? In order to make 
meaningful regulations, policymakers 
need high data apparency to be 
modeled as part of the data flows 
across intersecting or competing 
infrastructures or local ecosystem 
boundaries. By way of example, right 
now if we go from one coffee shop to 
another to access the Internet, we 
may be asked at each one to sign in 
and agree to the terms and conditions. 
Our access to sites at these locations 
may be faster or slower or perhaps 
time-limited, but the experience 
is largely similar. And yet, without 
data apparency, it is impossible to 
tell whether different data is being 
captured and what additional tracking 
is being added to the sites we visit. 
There is in these interactions a 
lack of another type of apparency 
signaling—what can happen to our data 
over time. To return to the apparency 
of the padlock icon, it signals a steady 
state process: The channel is either 
secure or it isn’t. There is only a now to 
that signal. But our captured data can 
be so multipurpose and can contribute 
to so many other ways of constructing 
largely terra incognita. We mainly 
hear about its failures. For example, 
IoT devices have been hacked to create 
denial-of-service attacks on domain-
name servers, thus cutting off Internet 
communications [12]. Or you may recall 
the TVs that track every word we speak 
in their presence, where the terms and 
conditions say this is all fair game. 
Where HCI can lead is to 
develop scenarios of interaction and 
models of people’s understanding 
of IoT interaction. Plainly, without 
understanding what we as citizens think 
is happening with these devices—and 
in particular with the data we enable 
them to capture—we cannot design 
safer, more usable experiences. For 
instance, trust and risk are concepts 
often discussed as putting the IoT 
project itself at risk. People may wrongly 
trust a service, such as online baby 
monitors, when the user experience 
maps to one’s expectations: Look, I can 
see my child. Success. But there could 
be a lack of what we might call risk 
apparency in what was happening with 
the data being made available. What if 
the service managing the connection 
between the camera and one’s phone 
was snooping? Here the perception of 
trust is inappropriately high, and of risk, 
inappropriately low. How interaction 
design can help connect with potentially 
autonomous agents to help users come to 
more informed understandings of these 
systems’ interactions within an IoT 
ecosystem is a new kind of interaction 
design challenge.
Groups like Consentua (http://
www.consentua.com/) have also been 
working on mechanisms for systems 
developers to be able to collect and 
respond to individuals’ consent, so that 
developers do not have to reinvent the 
consent wheel and can take advantage 
of interactions that have been designed 
and refined to deliver a high level 
of “consentfulness.” There is much 
fundamental work just to begin to 
map out the possible scenarios across 
multiple systems, and from there to 
explore how real people understand 
these systems and think about risks. As 
these are made apparent, the work will 
extend to the options they wish to have 
to address them. 
Where do users’ and designers’ 
models diverge, and how should we 
design for this? There is fundamental 
work to be done to engage with 
industries that want to deliver smart 
homes, cities, hospitals, and cars to 
connect those aspirations with citizens’ 
understanding and expectations. In 
2016, Nest “bricked” its smart hubs, 
devices that cost roughly $300. It 
was a blunt lack of apparency toward 
consumers who had made a purchase in 
good faith—and who believed, based 
on experiences with other devices in 
their homes, that Nest would continue 
to function as long as it was turned on, 
like a lamp or a router. Would a smart 
car be shut off by its developers if it 
too were construed to be always and 
only the property or IP of its service 
provider? This is a new model of how 
we think about physical devices. While 
we may be accustomed to buying 
software licenses, this approach to 
hardware is unexpected; when we buy 
something physical we are used to 
owning it. We need to explore whether 
we need new design languages or at 
least new semantics to signal these new 
properties—not just to accept them but 
also to be able to make choices about 
whether we wish to invest in them 
or to negotiate their terms. We also 
need apparency around the data flows 
between devices in these environments 
in order to understand, agree or disagree 
with, or change them. 
For instance, the majority of fitness 
trackers are tied to a particular vendor’s 
software service. The vendor accesses 
all the data. They may have APIs to 
enable other services to access that 
data as well under certain terms, but 
then both services have an individual’s 
data. The individual cannot simply 
buy the hardware and set up their own 
software server to track their own data. 
Without understanding what  
we as citizens think is happening  
with these devices, we cannot design 
safer, more usable experiences.
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a pattern. Time—in particular the 
future—is an unmet, open challenge. 
For example, in our current negotiation 
models, we test only those conditions 
where the data stays within a particular 
time frame. But what happens to 
collected data when the company is 
sold or closes and sells off its assets? 
The EU GDPR tries to take these 
kinds of future-proofing scenarios into 
account, but how do we represent these 
decisions in terms of interactions, from 
apparency to semantic and pragmatic 
transparency, to help consumers, 
businesses, and policymakers make 
choices? With rich apparency to s/p 
transparency interactions in which time 
is one of the variables to make apparent, 
consent for data use can be far more 
meaningful. 
Apparency of these conditions can 
also enable developers and businesses 
to have new markets and can create 
new and valuable differentiators. For 
instance, hardware developers may 
create open trackers that output open 
data to a health or storage device or 
service of their choice, where people 
themselves offer up their data for open 
studies, in which, like open software, 
access to the data used by any third 
party must remain open. 
CONCLUSION
If we do not have apparency-to-
transparency models of how our data 
is actually being used now and in 
potential futures, we cannot consent in a 
meaningful way to its use.
To consider whether or not we 
consent—assuming we can have a 
clearer sense of consent terms—we need 
a prime time in which to consider the 
terms of our consent policy, as we would 
our bank statements or insurance. 
To have consent, we need greater 
apparency of how data is being used as a 
result of our consent. For the scale and 
speed of the IoT, this apparency/consent 
decision will need to be automated 
on our behalf; there is rich potential 
to create nuanced human-centered 
services with our colleagues in AI that 
can leverage the negotiation of consent/
sharing terms. 
Having strong, clear apparency 
to real semantic and pragmatic 
transparency as a backbone to 
meaningful consent will also help clarify 
risks within the data flows of large-scale, 
heterogeneous IoT infrastructures, 
from homes to cities to national 
infrastructure. 
Overall, by improving apparency to 
s/p transparency, we make meaningful 
consent possible. When meaningful 
consent becomes part of a system, 
entirely new kinds of services may be 
imagined that create value based on 
visible, shareable data. We can also 
make services more resilient. To get 
there, we need the design acumen of 
HCI researchers and UX practitioners 
to help design, deliver, and evaluate 
apparency interactions at IoT scale. 
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